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How Does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Investment Efficiency? 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Prior evidence that higher quality financial reporting improves capital investment efficiency 
leaves unaddressed whether it reduces over- or under-investment.  This study provides evidence 
of both in documenting a conditional negative (positive) association between financial reporting 
quality and investment for firms operating in settings more prone to over-investment (under-
investment).  Firms with higher financial reporting quality also are found to deviate less from 
predicted investment levels and show less sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions.  These 
results suggest that one mechanism linking reporting quality and investment efficiency is a 
reduction of frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection that hamper efficient 
investment. 
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1.  Introduction 
Prior studies suggest that higher quality financial reporting should increase investment 
efficiency (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia, 2007).  Consistent with this argument, Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that firms with 
higher quality financial reporting exhibit higher investment efficiency proxied by lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivity.  However, investment-cash flow sensitivity can reflect either 
financing constraints or an excess of cash (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen, 2000).  These findings raise the further question of whether higher 
quality financial reporting is associated with a reduction of over-investment or with a reduction 
of under-investment.  This study provides evidence of both.   
We begin by positing that the association between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency relates to a reduction of information asymmetry between firms and 
external suppliers of capital.  For example, higher financial reporting quality could allow 
constrained firms to attract capital by making their positive net present value (NPV) projects 
more visible to investors and by reducing adverse selection in the issuance of securities.  
Alternatively, higher financial reporting quality could curb managerial incentives to engage in 
value destroying activities such as empire building in firms with ample capital.  This could be 
achieved, for example, if higher financial reporting facilitates writing better contracts that 
prevent inefficient investment and/or increases investors’ ability to monitor managerial 
investment decisions. 
Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that higher-quality financial reporting is 
associated with either lower over-investment, lower under-investment, or both.  We use three 
approaches to investigate these hypotheses.  First, we examine whether financial reporting 
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quality is associated with a lower investment among firms more prone to over-invest and higher 
investment for firms more likely to under-invest.  To do so, we partition the sample by firm-
specific characteristics – cash and leverage – shown to be associated with over- and under-
investment (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986).  Second, we directly model the expected level of 
investment based on a firm’s investment opportunities to examine the relation between financial 
reporting quality and the deviation from this expected level.  Third, we identify settings where 
firms are more likely to either over- or under-invest for exogenous reasons using as partitioning 
variables aggregate investment at the economy and the industry levels.   
Two key constructs in this analysis are investment efficiency and financial reporting 
quality.  We conceptually define a firm as investing efficiently if it undertakes projects with 
positive net present value (NPV) under the scenario of no market frictions such as adverse 
selection or agency costs.  Thus, under-investment includes passing up investment opportunities 
that would have positive NPV in the absence of adverse selection.  Correspondingly, over-
investment is defined as investing in projects with negative NPV.   
We define financial reporting quality as the precision with which financial reporting 
conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected cash flows, that 
inform equity investors.  This definition is consistent with the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (1978), which states that one objective 
of financial reporting is to inform present and potential investors in making rational investment 
decisions and in assessing the expected firm cash flows.  To enhance comparability with prior 
studies, we use a measure of accruals quality derived in Dechow and Dichev (2002) as one proxy 
for financial reporting quality.  This measure is based on the idea that accruals improve the 
informativeness of earnings by smoothing out transitory fluctuations in cash flows and it has 
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been used extensively in the prior literature.  Second, we use a measure of accruals quality 
proposed by Wysocki (2008) to address limitations in the Dechow and Dichev measure.  Finally, 
in order to capture a more forward-looking aspect of financial reporting quality, we use a 
measure of readability of financial statements proposed by Li (2008) called the FOG Index.  Li 
shows that the FOG Index is associated with earnings persistence and with future firm 
profitability. 
Our analysis yields three key findings.  First, we find that higher reporting quality is 
associated with both lower over- and under-investment.  Specifically, reporting quality is 
negatively associated with investment among firms shown by the prior literature to be more 
likely to over-invest (i.e., cash rich and unlevered firms) (Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986), and 
positively associated with investment among firms shown to be more likely to under-invest (e.g., 
firms that are cash constrained and highly levered).  Thus, this finding suggests that the relation 
between financial reporting quality and investment is conditional on the likelihood that a firm is 
in a setting more prone to over- or under-investment.  Second, firms with higher reporting 
quality are less likely to deviate from their predicted level of investment when modeled at the 
firm level.  Third, reporting quality is negatively related to investment when aggregate 
investment is high and positively related when aggregate investment is low.  This finding 
suggests that firms with higher financial reporting quality are less affected by aggregate macro-
economic shocks than firms with lower quality financial reporting.   
A credible alternative interpretation of our results is that they could be capturing the 
effect of different corporate governance mechanisms that are correlated with reporting quality.  
To address this concern, we explicitly test whether alternative monitoring mechanisms – namely 
institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and the market for corporate control (proxied by the 
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G-Score index of anti-takeover provisions) - are associated with investment efficiency.  The 
evidence is mixed on whether these governance mechanisms reduce over- and under-investment.  
However, our inferences regarding the association between financial reporting quality and 
investment are not affected by the inclusion of these corporate governance metrics suggesting 
that the effect we document is not simply a manifestation of reporting quality as a proxy for 
corporate governance. 
While our results suggest that financial reporting quality is associated with higher 
investment efficiency, some caveats are in order.  First, our main findings use a comprehensive 
measure of investment.  When we investigate sub-components of investment, our results are 
stronger for R&D activities and acquisitions than for capital expenditures but the results for 
capital expenditures are insignificant for the Wysocki (2008) measure of accruals quality and 
weaker for the FOG index.  Second, throughout the paper the results are strongest for the 
Dechow and Dichev’s measure than for the other financial reporting quality proxies.  Given the 
concerns raised by Wysocki (2008) regarding the construct validity of AQ as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality, we further show that our results are generally robust to the use of a 
financial reporting quality index based on the Wysocki measure of accruals quality and the FOG 
index.  Nevertheless, the economic magnitude of our findings might be better captured by the 
findings using these latter variables. 
Our findings contribute to a growing body of literature that studies relations between 
financial reporting quality and investment (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2006; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2008; Francis and Martin, 
2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008; McNichols and Stubben, 2008).  Documenting a relation 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency has both macro-economic (given 
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the importance of investment as a determinant of growth) and firm-level implications (given that 
investment is a major determinant of the return on capital obtained by investors).  Our results 
extend and generalize the prior results by considering a comprehensive measure of investment 
(and its sub-components), by using multiple proxies for financial reporting quality, and by 
specifically documenting an association between financial reporting quality and two sources of 
economic inefficiency, over-investment and under-investment.  This relation between financial 
reporting quality and over- and under-investment has been largely unexplored by the prior 
research. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the research design.  Section 4 presents the main results.  
Section 5 presents some sensitivity analyses.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Hypothesis development 
2.1.  Determinants of capital investment efficiency 
In the neo-classical framework, the marginal Q ratio is the sole driver of capital 
investment policy (e.g., Yoshikawa, 1980; Hayashi, 1982; Abel, 1983).  Firms invest until the 
marginal benefit of capital investment equals the marginal cost, subject to adjustment costs of 
installing the new capital; managers obtain financing for positive net present value projects at the 
prevailing economy-wide interest rate and return excess cash to investors.  However, the 
literature also recognizes the possibility that firms may depart from this optimal level and either 
over- or under-invest.  For example, prior research identifies two primary imperfections – moral 
hazard and adverse selection – caused by the existence of information asymmetry between 
managers and outside suppliers of capital, which can affect the efficiency of capital investment. 
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Managers maximizing their personal welfares are sometimes inclined to make 
investments that are not in the best interests of shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  Models of moral hazard use this intuition to suggest that managers will invest 
in negative net present value projects when there is divergence in principal-agent incentives.  
Moral hazard can lead to either over- or under-investment depending on the availability of 
capital.  On one hand, the natural tendency to over-invest will produce excess investment ex post 
if firms have resources to invest.  For example, Jensen (1986) predicts that managers have 
incentives to consume perquisites and to grow their firms beyond the optimal size.  These 
predictions receive empirical support from Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanez, and Shleifer (1994), 
among others.  On the other hand, suppliers of capital are likely to recognize this problem and to 
ration capital ex-ante, which may lead to under-investment ex-post (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Lambert et al., 2007). 
Models of adverse selection suggest that if managers are better informed than investors 
about a firm’s prospects, they will try to time capital issuances to sell overpriced securities (i.e., a 
lemon’s problem).  If they are successful, they may over-invest these proceeds (e.g., Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler, 2003).  However, investors may respond rationally by rationing capital, 
which may lead to ex-post under-investment.  For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that 
when managers act in favor of existing shareholders and the firm needs to raise funds to finance 
an existing positive net present value project, managers may refuse to raise funds at a discounted 
price even if that means passing up good investment opportunities.  
The discussion above suggests that information asymmetries between firms and suppliers 
of capital can reduce capital investment efficiency by giving rise to frictions such as moral 
hazard and adverse selection that can each lead to produce over- and under-investment.  In the 
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next section, we discuss how financial reporting quality can reduce these information 
asymmetries and can be associated with investment efficiency. 
 
2.2.  Financial reporting quality and sub-optimal investment levels 
Prior studies suggest that higher quality financial reporting can enhance investment 
efficiency by mitigating information asymmetries that cause economic frictions such as moral 
hazard and adverse selection (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Verrecchia, 2001).  For example, it is well established that financial reporting information is 
used by shareholders to monitor managers (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001) and 
constitutes an important source of firm-specific information for investors (e.g., Bushman and 
Indjejikian, 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Kanodia and Lee, 1998).  If higher quality 
financial reporting increases shareholder ability to monitor managerial investment activities, it 
can be associated with investment efficiency by reducing moral hazard.   
However, the existence of information asymmetry between the firm and investors could 
also lead suppliers of capital to infer that a firm raising capital is of a bad type and to discount 
the stock price (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Financial reporting quality may mitigate this problem.  
Consistent with this view, Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2009) propose a model of dynamic 
adverse selection and show empirically that firms with better financial reporting have more 
flexibility to issue capital.  If financial reporting quality reduces adverse selection costs, it can be 
associated with investment efficiency through the reduction in external financing costs and 
through the reduction in the likelihood that a firm obtains excess funds because of temporary 
mispricing.  These findings suggest that high-quality financial reporting also operates to reduce 
adverse selection. 
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Based on the discussion above, we hypothesize that higher quality financial reporting is 
negatively associated with over- and/or under-investment.  Specifically, we form the following 
two hypotheses:   
 
H1a: Financial reporting quality is negatively associated with over-investment.  
 
H1b: Financial reporting quality is negatively associated with under-investment. 
 
 
2.3.  Other governance mechanisms 
The above hypotheses suggest a link between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency.  However, other governance mechanisms could also be associated with investment 
efficiency.  For instance, Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that firms with higher institutional 
ownership have lower capital expenditures and higher valuations, suggesting that institutional 
ownership mitigates over-investment.  Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2006) show that greater 
analyst coverage improves the flexibility in the financial policy, which may help to mitigate 
under-investment.  Jensen (1986) argues that the market for corporate control can serve as a 
monitoring mechanism that mitigates over-investment.  Consistent with this prediction, 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) show that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher 
firm value, lower capital expenditures, and make fewer corporate acquisitions.  Given these 
possibilities, our empirical analyses explicitly test whether these governance mechanisms are 
also associated with lower under- and/or over-investment.   
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3.  Research design 
We test these hypotheses in three ways.  First, we examine the relation between financial 
reporting quality and the level of capital investment conditional on whether the firm is more 
likely to over- or under-invest.  We use firm-specific characteristics (identified by the prior 
literature) to classify firms with higher likelihood of over- or under-investing (in Section 5, we 
also consider measures of over- and under-investment based on economy-wide and industry-
specific partitions).  Second, we directly model the expected level of firm-specific capital 
investment based on the firm’s investment opportunities, and test the association between 
financial reporting quality and deviations from this expected level (our second proxy for over- 
and under-investment).  As a robustness check, we also condition on investment aggregated at 
economy and industry levels to provide a proxy for over- and under-investment less affected by 
firm-specific financial reporting quality (see Section 5.2). 
 
3.1.  Conditional relation between financial reporting quality and investment 
First, we test whether higher financial reporting quality is negatively (positively) 
associated with investment when firms are more likely to over-invest (under-invest).  
Specifically we estimate the following model. 
 Investmenti,t+1  = α + β1 FRQi,t  + β2 FRQi,t * OverIi,t+1 + β3 OverIi,t+1 +  
 β4 Govi,t  + β5 Govi,t * OverIi,t+1 + Σγj Controlj,i,t + εi,t+1   (1) 
As described in detail below, our main measure of investment (Investment) includes both 
capital and non-capital investment (we discuss alternative measures of investment in Section 5).  
FRQ is one of the three different measures of financial reporting quality.  OverI is a ranked 
variable used to distinguish between settings where over- or under- investment is more likely (as 
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detailed below, OverI is increasing in the likelihood of over-investment).  Gov is a set of 
corporate governance proxies.  Control is a set of control variables.   
We estimate Equation 1 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  We adjust the standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity, serial-, and cross-sectional correlation using a two-dimensional 
cluster at the firm and year level.  This technique is proposed by Petersen (2009) as the preferred 
method for estimating standard errors in corporate finance applications using panel data.  We 
also include industry fixed-effects using the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification 
to control for industry-specific shocks to investment.   
Hypothesis H1b predicts that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with 
under-investment.  We test this prediction by examining if the coefficient on reporting quality is 
greater than zero (i.e., H1b: β1 > 0).  That is, given that OverI is increasing (decreasing) in the 
likelihood of over-investment (under-investment), the coefficient β1 measures the relation 
between reporting quality and investment when under-investment is most likely.  Alternatively, 
Hypothesis H1a predicts that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with over-
investment.  Since the coefficient β2 measures the incremental relation between reporting quality 
and investment as over-investment becomes more likely, the sum of the coefficients on the main 
and interaction effects (β1 + β2) measures the relation between reporting quality and investment 
when over-investment is most likely.  We thus use the joint effect of these coefficients to test the 
association predicted by hypothesis H1a (i.e., H1a: β1 + β2 < 0).  A corollary of hypotheses H1a 
and H1b is that the coefficient on the interaction term between reporting quality and over-
investment is less than zero (i.e., β2 < 0).  We also test this corollary. 
We use an accounting-based framework to estimate total investment as the difference 
between total investment and asset sales (Richardson, 2006).  An advantage of this approach is 
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that it considers several types of investments such as capital expenditures, acquisitions and asset 
sales.  In addition, we explicitly incorporate research and development into our measure of 
investment because of the increasing importance of R&D in recent years.  This measure contrasts 
with prior research that normally studies these components separately (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; 
Bushman et al., 2006; Francis and Martin, 2008).  Investment in a given firm-year is the sum of 
capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE, scaled by lagged 
total assets.  For comparability with other research, in Section 5 we discuss the results for the 
sub-components of investment. 
We use four different proxies for financial reporting quality.  The first measure, accruals 
quality (AQ), is derived from prior work (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002) and has 
been used extensively in the prior literature (e.g., Aboody, Hughes and Liu, 2005; Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004, 2005; Core, Guay, and Verdi, 2008).  The measure is based 
on the idea that accruals are estimates of future cash flows, and earnings will be more predicative 
of future cash flows when there is lower estimation error embedded in the accruals process.  We 
estimate discretionary accruals using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model augmented by the 
fundamental variables in the Jones (1991) model as suggested by McNichols (2002).  The model 
is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows plus the 
change in revenue and PPE.  Following Francis et al. (2005), we estimate the Dechow and 
Dichev model cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year 
based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  AQ, at year t is defined as the 
standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev model during the 
years t-5 to t-1 (lagged by an extra year due to the inclusion of one-year ahead cash flow in the 
DD model), assuring that all explanatory variables are measured before period t for the 
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computation of AQ in that year.  We multiply by negative one so that AQ is increasing in 
financial reporting quality.  
The second proxy for reporting quality is a modification of the accruals quality measure 
proposed by Wysocki (2008), who argues that the measure derived in Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
does not reliably capture high quality accruals.  Wysocki proposes a modified version of the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure that aims to capture the incremental association between 
current accruals and past and future cash flows over and above the association between current 
accruals and current cash flows.  The motivation behind this measure is to extract the 
contemporaneous association between accruals and cash flows which could be confounded by 
opportunistic earnings management activities.  This measure is estimated in two steps.  First, we 
estimate two variations of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.  The first model is a regression of 
working capital accruals on current cash flows.  The second model is the original Dechow and 
Dichev model that regresses working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows.  
We then compute the standard deviation of the residuals of each model during the years t-5 to t-1.  
Our second measure of financial reporting quality (AQWi) is the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the simpler model to the full model (i.e., STD (Resid1) / STD (Resid2)).1   
To avoid concerns regarding the measurement of accruals quality, we also consider a 
third proxy for reporting quality by Li (2008) measuring financial disclosure transparency.  Li 
computes the FOG index as a measure of the readability of financial reports.  The idea is that 
managers can obfuscate the quality of the financial report by making it harder for investors to 
understand and to infer the future cash flow implications of current accounting information.  In 
fact, Li shows that firms with a large FOG index are associated with a lower earnings persistence 
                                                 
1 Two other measures of accruals quality proposed by Wysocki (2008) are intended to address the firm-specific 
time-series (as opposed to the cross sectional) estimation of the Dechow and Dichev model which is not used in our 
paper.   
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and lower future profitability.  As with AQ, we multiply the FOG measure by minus one so that 
it is increasing in reporting quality.  Finally, we form a summary statistic for financial reporting 
by normalizing these three proxies (AQ, AQWi and FOG) and taking the average of these three 
measures.2  We use this summary measure (FRQ Index) as a fourth measure of reporting quality 
and in Section 5.3 also consider a version that omits AQ (FRQ Index2). 
In order to test the conditional relation between financial reporting quality and investment 
(Equation 1), we need a proxy for over- and under-investment.  We use ex-ante firm-specific 
characteristics that are likely to affect the likelihood that a firm will over- or under-invest.  In our 
first test, we focus on firm liquidity using two variables identified by the prior literature.  We use 
firm cash balance as a partitioning variable based on the argument that firms without cash are 
more likely to be financially constrained.  Alternatively, firms with large cash balances are more 
likely to face agency problems and to over-invest (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Blanchard et al., 1994; 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999).3  We also use firm leverage as another proxy for 
firm liquidity.  Firms with high leverage are more likely to suffer a debt overhang problem that 
will force them to under-invest (e.g., Myers, 1977).  We first rank firms into deciles based on 
their cash balance and their leverage (we multiply leverage by minus one before ranking so that, 
as for cash, it is increasing with the likelihood of over-investment) and re-scale them to range 
between zero and one.  We then create a composite score measure, OverFirm, which is computed 
as the average of ranked values of the two partitions variables.  We do so because each measure 
                                                 
2 We also estimate a principal-component analysis and the factor solution consists of one factor with eigenvalue 
larger than one (1.22).  We obtain similar results if we use the principal factor as the aggregate measure of 
accounting quality.  We present the results using the standardized averages because they are common practice in the 
literature (Grice and Harris, 1998). 
3 We note that it is possible that firms accumulate cash in anticipation for financing constraints.  However, the 
empirical finding in the literature (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Opler et al., 1999) is that, on average, firms with high 
cash are more likely to face agency problems that lead to inefficient use of the excessive cash such as empire 
building and perquisite consumption.  We also concede that it is possible that leverage and liquidity are affected by 
accounting quality. 
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is likely to capture the liquidity of the firm with error and by aggregating these variables we 
expect to reduce measurement error in the individual variables.   
In the context of Equation 1, the estimated coefficient (β1) measures the association 
between financial reporting quality and investment for firms with the lowest amount of cash and 
highest level of leverage (i.e., firms in the bottom decile).  Likewise, the sum of the coefficients 
(β1 + β2) measures the association between reporting quality and capital investment for firms 
with the highest amount of cash and lowest amount of debt (i.e., firms in the top decile).   
As discussed in Section 2, we also investigate an alternative hypothesis that corporate 
governance mechanisms could also be associated with over- and/or under-investment.  We use 
three proxies for corporate governance - the presence of institutional investors, financial analysts, 
and the market for corporate control.  Institutional ownership (Institutions) is the percentage of 
institutional investors in the firm provided by Thomson Financial and analysts (Analysts) is the 
number of financial analysts following the firm as reported by IBES.  Following prior literature 
(e.g., Chang et al., 2006), we assume that firms not covered by IBES have zero analyst coverage.  
We use InvG-Score, the anti-takeover protection index used in Gompers et al. (2003), as a proxy 
for the market for corporate control.  Firms with large G-scores have more anti-takeover 
provisions that reduce the ability of a takeover to act as a monitoring device for managers.  For 
consistency with our other measures, we multiply the score by minus one so that the measure is 
increasing in corporate governance.  Because G-scores are missing for 60% of our sample, we 
set observations with missing G-scores to zero.  We then include an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the data is missing and zero otherwise.  We add interactions between 
OverFirm and Institutions, Analysts, and InvG-Score to separately test the effect of these 
governance mechanisms on over- and under-investment.   
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We also introduce controls for effects that could confound our findings.  First, we control 
for a series of variables to mitigate concerns that the investment behavior we document is not 
merely extracting “innate factors” influencing both accruals quality and investment behavior.  
Liu and Wysocki (2007) suggest that a combination of cash-flow and sales volatilities subsumes 
the relation between accruals quality and proxies for the cost of capital.  Thus, we control for 
cash flow and sales volatility.  We also control for investment volatility to ensure that the results 
are not simply capturing a relation between over- and under-investment and investment 
volatility.  Second, as discussed in Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; and 
Dechow and Dichev, 2002), firms in different stages of the business cycle may have different 
(discretionary) accruals arising from differences in their business models that are unrelated to 
earnings management activities.  We thus include as controls a measure of age, the length of the 
operating cycle, and the frequency of losses.  Finally, following Biddle and Hilary (2006), we 
control for firm size, the market-to-book ratio, bankruptcy risk, tangibility, industry leverage, 
and dividend payout ratio since these were found previously to be related to capital investment.4   
 
3.2  Deviation from the expected level of investment 
The analysis described in Section 3.1 has focused on the conditional relation between 
financial reporting quality and investment under the assumption that the conditioning variable 
(i.e., the likelihood that a firm is in a setting prone to over- or under-investment) is exogenous 
with respect to individual firms.  In this section we investigate whether higher financial reporting 
quality reduces the likelihood that a firm deviates from the expected investment level.  That is, 
whereas Section 3.1 investigates if high financial reporting quality is associated with a smaller 
                                                 
4 We omit R&D from this set because R&D is part of our measure of total investment.  In addition, leverage and 
cash are also omitted because they are used to compute OverFirm, which is included in the model.  Untabulated 
results indicate that including these variables does not affect our conclusions. 
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difference between actual and expected investment given that the firm is in a condition more 
prone to either over- or under-investment, here we directly model if higher financial reporting 
quality is associated with a lower likelihood that a firm over- or under-invests. 
We proceed by first estimating a firm-specific model of investment as a function of 
growth opportunities (as measured by sales growth) and use the residuals as a firm-specific 
proxy for deviations from expected investment.5  The model is described below: 
Investmenti,t+1 =  β0 + β1 * Sales Growthi,t + εi,t+1     (2) 
Investmentt+1 is the total investment and Sales Growtht is the percentage change in sales from 
year t-1 to t.  Equation 2 is estimated for each industry-year based on the Fama and French 48-
industry classification for all industries with at least 20 observations in a given year. 
We then classify firms based on the magnitude of the residuals (i.e., deviations from 
predicted investment) and use these groups as the dependent variable.  Specifically, we sort firms 
yearly based on the residuals from Equation 2 into quartiles.  Firm-year observations in the 
bottom quartile (i.e., the most negative residuals) are classified as under-investing, observations 
in the top quartile (i.e., the most positive residuals) are classified as over-investing, and 
observations in the middle two quartiles are classified as the benchmark group.  We estimate a 
multinomial logit model that predicts the likelihood that a firm will be in one of the extreme 
quartiles as opposed to the middle quartiles.  H1a and H1b predict that firms with higher 
financial reporting quality will be less likely to be in the top (bottom) quartile of unexplained 
investment.  Our set of explanatory and control variables are the same we use in estimating 
                                                 
5 The literature in corporate finance often uses Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth (Hubbard, 1998).  We use sales 
growth because Tobin’s Q can arguably be affected by financial reporting quality and because marginal Q is 
notoriously hard to measure.  In untabulated analysis, we find that results are similar if we estimate the model using 
Q as a proxy for growth or if we include both sales growth and Q in the investment model.  
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Equation 1 but we also control for cash and leverage (as described in footnote 4, these variables 
are omitted above because they are used to compute OverFirm, which is included in the model). 
 
4.  Main Empirical Results 
4.1.  Sample and descriptive statistics  
Our main sample consists of 34,791 firm-year observations from 1993 to 2005.  We start 
in 1993 because the FOG measure is only available post-1993 (and the G-Score post-1991).  We 
collect financial reporting data from Compustat, price and return data from CRSP, analyst data 
from IBES, ownership from Thomson Financial, and governance data from Gompers et al. 
(2003).  Consistent with previous practice in the literature, financial firms (i.e., SIC codes in the 
6000 and 6999 range) are excluded because of the different nature of investment for these firms.  
In order to mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 
99% levels by year at the firm-year level.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables described above.  The 
mean (median) Investment across all firm-years equals 14.14% (9.28%) of prior years’ assets.  
The mean (median) firm in the sample has an AQ of -0.06 (-0.04).  Similarly, the mean (median) 
values for AQWi and FOG are 1.18 (1.12) and -19.31 (-19.15).  These values are consistent with 
prior research (Francis et al., 2005; Li, 2008; Wysocki, 2008).   
Panel B of Table 1 presents correlations among our main variables.  The two accruals 
quality measures are positively and significantly related (correlation of 0.19).  The correlation 
between FOG and the two accruals quality measures is lower (0.08 and 0.04, respectively), likely 
because FOG captures other dimensions of accounting quality unrelated to accruals.  On a 
univariate basis, all four measures of reporting quality are negatively correlated with Investment, 
 19
with the correlations ranging from -0.05 to -0.13.  However, as shown below, the relation 
between financial quality and investment is conditional on the firm propensity to over- or under-
invest.   
 
4.2. Conditional tests 
Table 2 reports the results for our conditional tests of hypotheses H1a and H1b.  We find 
evidence that reporting quality is positively associated with investment among firms with higher 
likelihood of under-investing.  That is, the estimated coefficient on reporting quality is positive 
and statistically significant in all four columns.  The t-statistics range from 1.89 for AQWi to 2.60 
for FRQ Index.  In terms of the economic significance, increasing AQ (AQWi) by one standard 
deviation increases Investment by approximately 0.71% (0.27%) among firms that are under-
investing.  Given that the mean investment equals 14.14%, this effect represents an increase of 
5.0% (1.9%).  These findings provide consistent support for hypothesis H1b.   
In terms of the interaction between reporting quality and over-investment, we find that 
the estimated coefficient is negative and significant in all four specifications (with t-statistics 
ranging from -2.67 for AQWi to -4.46 for FRQ Index).  Further, the overall effect of reporting 
quality on investment among firms that are over-investing (as measured by the sum of the 
coefficients on reporting quality and on the interaction between reporting quality and OverFirm) 
is negative and significant in all cases.  The untabulated t-statistics range from -2.84 for AQWi to 
-4.78 for FRQ Index.  In terms of the economic significance, increasing AQ (AQWi) by one 
standard deviation decreases Investment among firms that are over-investing by approximately 
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1.0% (0.6%).  This effect represents a decrease in investment of about 7.3% (4.4%) on a relative 
basis.  Thus, the findings in Table 2 also provide consistent support for hypothesis H1a.6   
When we turn our attention to the corporate governance variables, we find that the 
estimated coefficients on the main effects are positive for institutional ownership and, against the 
prediction, negative for InvG-Score.  In terms of the interactions between the proxies for 
corporate governance and OverFirm, the estimate coefficients are generally insignificant 
suggesting that the relation between investment and governance is independent of the likelihood 
that the firm might over-invest.  The other variables are statistically insignificant.  These findings 
suggest that the institutional ownership (the effectiveness of the market for corporate control) 
increases (decreases) investment regardless of whether a firm is more or less likely to over-
invest.      
In our main test, we use an aggregated measure of cash balance and leverage to classify 
firms by the likelihood that they will over- or under-invest.  We do so to mitigate the random 
error component in the individual measures.  When we use cash and leverage as separate 
portioning variables, untabulated results indicate that the interaction between our overall measure 
of reporting quality and either variable is significant (with t-statistics equal to -4.30 and -3.72, 
respectively).  The coefficient associated with FRQ is also positive in both cases but only 
significant for cash (with t-statistics equal to 2.11 and 1.40 for cash and leverage, respectively).   
                                                 
6 Due to the interaction with accounting quality, the coefficients on OverFirm measure the effect of over-investment 
on investment when accounting quality is zero, which is never the case in our sample.  In untabulated regressions, 
we re-estimate the models in Table 2 after centering accounting quality to zero.  In this case, the coefficients on 
OverFirm are positive and significant as predicted. 
 21
 
4.3.  Unconditional tests  
Our analysis so far has been conditional on the firm being in a setting where over- or 
under-investment is more likely.  We next directly model the association between financial 
reporting quality and the likelihood of over- or under-investing.  We form a variable (Inv_state) 
that takes the value of one if the residual from the Investment regression (Equation (2)) is in the 
bottom quartile of the distribution (i.e., firms classified as under-investing), the value of two if it 
is in the middle two quartiles, and the value of three if it is in the top quartile (i.e., firms 
classified as over-investing).   
Before considering a multivariate analysis, it is useful to examine the univariate relation 
between the investment residuals across the three groups of accounting quality (Figure 1).  Panel 
A presents the analyses for firms that are more likely to under-invest.  We find a positive 
association between reporting quality and the investment residuals.  For example, the investment 
residual increases from -14.5% to -13.7% as AQ increases across terciles.  Similarly, investment 
residual increases from -14.2% to -13.3% as the aggregate reporting quality index (FRQ Index) 
increases.  Panel B presents the analysis for firms that are classified as over-investing.  In this 
case, there is a negative association between reporting quality and the investment residuals.  For 
example, investment residual decreases from 19.4% to 14.9% as the aggregate reporting quality 
index (FRQ Index) increases from the bottom to the top tercile.  Overall, the results in Figure 1 
suggest that, among firms that are under-investing, firms with higher reporting quality invest 
approximately 1% more than firms with lower reporting quality.  On the other hand, when firms 
are over-investing, firms with higher reporting quality invest approximately 3% less than firms 
with lower reporting quality. 
 22
We then estimate a multinomial logistic regression that tests the likelihood that a firm 
might be in the extreme investment residual quartiles as a function of financial reporting quality.  
This specification considers simultaneously, but separately, the likelihood of over- and under-
investment.  Results of this estimation are reported in Table 3 (the case when Inv_state equals 2 
– i.e., the middle quartile is used as the benchmark).  Panel A presents the results regarding 
under-investment.  The coefficients associated with financial reporting quality all have the 
predicted sign.  However, only the coefficients for AQ, FOG or the FRQ Index are statistically 
significant (with t-statistics ranging from -2.32 to -2.40) whereas the coefficient for AQWi is 
insignificant.  Panel B presents the results regarding over-investment.  The results with the 
financial reporting quality proxies are similar to the findings in panel A.  That is, the coefficients 
are negative and significant for AQ, FOG and the FRQ Index (with t-statistics ranging from -1.80 
to -3.62), but are insignificant for AQWi.   
When we consider the governance variables, we find that institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with the likelihood that a firm is in the under-investment quartile (Panel 
A).  InvGscore is statistically insignificant in all cases.  In addition, institutional ownership and 
analyst coverage are positively associated with the likelihood that a firm is in the over-investment 
quartile.  These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that corporate governance mitigates 
over-investment but are consistent with the results in Table 2 that show a positive association 
between some institutional ownership and capital investment.   
 
5.  Robustness checks 
As robustness checks, we conduct three additional sets of tests.  First, we divide our 
overall measure of investment between capital expenditure (Capex) and non-capital expenditure 
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investment (Non-Capex).  Second, we examine two alternative partitioning variables based on 
aggregate and industry data.  To avoid repetition, we use the aggregated reporting quality factor 
(FRQ Index) as the proxy for financial reporting quality in these tests and discuss the results for 
the individual proxies in the text.  Finally, we also assess the sensitivity of our results to a 
financial reporting quality index that is solely based on AQWi and FOG, and does not include 
AQ (FRQ Index2). 
 
5.1.  Capex versus non-capex investment 
When we calculate our measure of investment, we consider both capital expenditures and 
non-capital expenditures.  This approach follows Richardson (2006).  As a robustness check, we 
decompose the overall investment into two components.  We compute Capex as the capital 
expenditures, scaled by lagged property, plant, and equipment.  We compute Non-Capex as the 
sum of R&D expenditures and acquisitions, scaled by lagged total assets (results are unchanged 
if we include advertising expenses in Non-Capex.)  We re-estimate our main model using these 
two measures.   
Results reported in Table 4 indicate that, when using the FRQ Index as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality, the results are not affected by the decision to use Capex or Non-
Capex as the dependent variable.  The main effects for financial reporting quality are positive 
and significant (the t-statistics equal 3.38 and 5.95) whereas the interaction terms between 
OverFirm and FRQ Index are negative and significant (with t-statistics of -5.91 and -8.02).  In 
untabulated analysis, however, we find that the results with Capex are driven by AQ and FOG 
whereas the results with Non-Capex are robust to all three of these proxies for financial reporting 
quality.  Specifically, when Capex is used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients 
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are significant with the predicted sign for AQ (t-statistics of 6.16 and -7.54 on the main and 
interaction effects respectively), of marginal significance with the predicted sign for FOG (t-
statistics of 1.28 and -2.44), and statistically insignificant for AQWi (t-statistics of -1.18 and -
0.51).  However, when Non-Capex is used as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients 
are always significant with the predicted signs for the main (t-statistics of 5.27, -6.85, 5.27) and 
interaction effects (t-statistics of -4.57, 2.65, and -3.19) of AQ, AQWi and FOG, respectively. 
With respect to the corporate governance variables, we find that InvG-Index, is negatively 
associated with investment for firms likely to under-invest and positively associated with Capex 
for firms likely to over-invest.  We find opposite results for analyst coverage but only in the 
Capex regression, with Analyst statistically insignificant in the Non-Capex regression.  
Institutional ownership is positively associated with Non-Capex investment among firms likely 
to under-invest but also positively (against prediction) associated with Capex among firms likely 
to over-invest. 
 
5.2.  Partitioning variables at the aggregate and industry levels 
In the analysis above, we use firm characteristics – cash and leverage – to proxy for the 
likelihood that a firm will over- or under-invest.  Ideally, one would develop an exogenous firm-
specific measure that would identify these situations.  This is empirically challenging since our 
hypotheses predict an association between financial reporting quality and over/under-investment.  
As a sensitivity analysis, we use investment aggregated at the economy and industry levels as 
proxies for the likelihood of over- and under-investment based on the idea that aggregate 
investment is less likely to be affected by firm-specific financial reporting quality.  Specifically, 
in each of the sample years, we measure the average Investment and average Sales Growth in the 
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overall economy.  We estimate Equation 2 using these aggregated data and use the residuals as 
proxies for aggregate over-investment in a given year.  We then rank the residuals from these 
models into deciles (re-scaled from zero to one) to form a measure of aggregate over-investment 
in each year, OverAggregate.  We similarly estimate an investment model at the industry level 
using the average Investment and average Sales Growth for all industries with at least 20 
observations in a given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification for 
each year.  We rank the residuals from the industry-year estimation of Equation 2 into deciles to 
form a measure of aggregate industry-year over-investment, OverIndustry.  We then re-estimate 
Equation 1 using these two different partitioning variables as a proxy for OverI.  The industry 
analysis is conducted over our usual sample period (1993 to 2005).  However, this relatively 
short period provides little time-series variation, which is especially important at the economy 
level.  Thus, for the aggregate-economy partition, we present the results for an expanded sample 
period of 1975 to 2005 omitting the governance variables since these data are not available for 
the earlier years.   
Results are presented in Table 5 for the industry partitioning in Column 1 and the 
aggregate partitioning in Column 2.  The results are consistent with our previous conclusions.  
For the industry-based partition (Column 1), the estimated coefficients have the predicted sign 
but FRQ Index is not statistically significant.  The interaction term (with a t-statistic of -2.91) and 
the joint effect are significantly different from zero.7  For the economy-based partition (Column 
2), both the coefficient on the FRQ Index variable and its interaction with OverAggregate have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant (the t-statistics are 4.12 and -6.14).  The joint 
effects are also significantly negative, suggesting that the negative relation between reporting 
                                                 
7 When we expand the sample period to 1975 to 2005 (and omit the corporate governance variables), both FRQ and 
its interaction with OverIndustry become statistically significant (with t-statistics of 2.66 and -4.09).   
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quality and investment among firms more likely to over-invest is also robust to these alternative 
specifications. 
In an untabulated analysis, we re-estimate our two specifications using the individual 
measures of reporting quality.  For the industry partition, the results are generally consistent with 
AQ, weaker with FOG but insignificant with AQWi.  In addition, the results are stronger for 
over-investment than for under-investment.  Specifically, the t-statistics for the main effect 
(interaction terms) are 1.87, -0.07, and 1.06 (-2.79, 0.80, and -3.42) for AQ, AQWi and FOG, 
respectively.  For the aggregate partition, the results are significant in three out of four cases.  
Specifically, the t-statistics for the main effect (interaction terms) are 3.95 and 0.72 (-5.44 and -
2.93) for AQ and AQWi, respectively.  
When we turn our attention to the proxies for corporate governance, our results are also 
similar to previous findings.  Institutions is significantly positive, InvGscore is significantly 
negative and the interaction between InvG-Score and OverIndustry is positive.  All the other 
variables are statistically insignificant. 
 
5.3.  Financial Reporting Quality Index without AQ 
As discussed above, our results are stronger for AQ than for the remaining financial 
reporting quality proxies.  However, one concern with AQ suggested by Wysocki (2008) is that it 
might not be a good proxy for financial reporting quality.  To ensure that our results are not 
simply driven by AQ, we repeat all our tests with an alternative financial reporting quality index 
that aggregates only AQWi and FOG and omits AQ (FRQ Index2).  The results are generally 
consistent with our predictions.  That is, the estimated coefficients have the predicted signs and 
are statistically significant in all but two cases.  The two exceptions are the main effects for 
 27
financial reporting quality in the Capex regression (Table 4) and for aggregate investment (Table 
5) with t-statistics of 0.98 and 1.30, respectively.  Overall these results show that our findings are 
not simply driven by AQ and that are generally consistent when using alternative proxies for 
financial reporting quality.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Prior studies suggest that higher financial reporting quality can improve investment 
efficiency by reducing information asymmetries that give rise to frictions such as moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  We extend this research by documenting the channels by which financial 
reporting quality relates to investment efficiency.  Specifically, we test the hypotheses that 
higher financial reporting quality can be associated with either lower over- or under-investment. 
Our results are consistent with these hypotheses when tested in several ways.  First, 
higher financial reporting quality is associated with lower investment among firms that are cash 
rich and unlevered, and with higher investment among firms that are cash constrained and highly 
levered.  In addition, firms with high financial reporting quality invest less when aggregate 
investment is high, and invest more when aggregate investment level is low.  These results are 
consistent with the argument that financial reporting quality facilitates investment for 
constrained firms, and curbs investment for firms that are more likely to over-invest.  Finally, 
firms with higher financial reporting quality are less likely to deviate from their predicted level 
of investment.  Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that financial reporting quality 
serves a role in mitigating information frictions that ultimately hamper investment efficiency. 
While our findings suggest that financial reporting quality is associated with lower over- 
and under-investment, an opportunity exists to extend our findings in several ways.  First, one 
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could explore the causal link between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.  
Second, one could further explore the link between reporting quality and either over- or under-
investment.  For instance, one could study whether the negative relation between reporting 
quality and under-investment is due to firm’s ability to raise debt and/or equity capital.  Finally, 
one could explore other dimensions of investment such as the riskiness of investment activities 
(see Loktionov (2009) for a recent paper in this area).  We leave these issues for future research. 
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Appendix 1 – Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
Investment = the sum of research and development expenditure (item 46), capital expenditure 
(item 128), and acquisition expenditure (item 129) less cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant, and equipment (item 107) multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged 
total assets (item 6).  
Capex = capital expenditure (item 128) multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged PPE 
(item 8).  
Non-Capex = the sum of research and development expenditure (item 46) and acquisition 
expenditure (item 129) multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets (item 
6).  
 
Financial Reporting Quality 
AQ  = is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and 
Dichev model during the years t-5 to t-1 and multiplied by negative one.  The 
model is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future 
cash flows plus the change in revenue and PPE.  All variables are scaled by 
average total assets.  The model is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry 
with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 
48-industry classification.  
AQWi  = a modified version of the accruals quality measure as proposed by Wysocki 
(2008). It equals the ratio of the standard deviation of the residuals from the simpler 
accruals quality model to the full model (i.e., STD (Resid1) / STD (Resid2)).  The 
simpler model is a regression of working capital accruals on current cash flows. 
The full model is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and 
future cash flows.  We then compute the standard deviation of the residuals of each 
model during the years t-5 to t-1.   
FOG = A measure of financial statement readability computed by Li (2008). 
FRQ Index = A continuous variable computed as the standardized average of AQ, AQWi, and 
FOG. 
 
Over-investment Proxies 
OverFirm  = a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked (deciles) measure of cash 
and leverage.  Leverage is multiplied by minus one before ranking so that both 
variables are increasing in the likelihood of over-investment. 
OverAggregate = a ranked variable based on the unexplained aggregate investment rate for all 
firms in the economy.  Specifically, in each year we measure the average 
investment in the economy for Investment, Capex, and Non-Capex, and regress 
aggregate investment on aggregate sales growth.  We then rank the residual from 
this model into deciles and re-scale from zero to one. 
OverIndustry  = a ranked variable based on the unexplained industry-year investment.  
Specifically, in each industry-year we measure aggregate investment for 
Investment, Capex, and Non-Capex, and regress industry-year investment on 
industry-year sales growth.  We then rank the residual from this model into 
deciles and re-scale from zero to one. 
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Governance Variables 
Institutions  = The percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors. 
Analysts = The number of analysts following the firm as provided by IBES.  
InvG-Score = The measure of anti-takeover protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), multiplied by minus one. 
G-Score dummy = an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing, and 
zero otherwise.   
 
Control Variables 
LogAsset  = the log of total assets (item 6). 
Mkt-to-Book  = the ratio of the market value of total assets (item 6 + (item 25 * item 199) – item 
60 – item 74) to book value of total assets (item 6). 
σ(CFO)  = standard deviation of the cash flow from operations deflated by average total 
assets from years t-5 to t-1. 
σ(Sales)  = standard deviation of the sales deflated by average total assets from years t-5 to 
t-1. 
σ(I)  = standard deviation of investment (Investment, Capex, and Non-Capex) from 
years t-5 to t-1. 
Z-Score  = 3.3*(item 170) + (item 12) + 0.25*(item 36) + 0.5*((items 4 – item 5) / item 6). 
Tangibility  = the ratio of PPE (item 8) to total assets (item 6). 
K-structure  = the ratio of long-term debt (item 9) to the sum of long-term debt to the market 
value of equity (item 9 + item 25*item199). 
Ind. K-structure = Mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry. 
CFOsale  = The ratio of CFO to sales (item 12). 
Slack  = The ratio of cash (item 1) to PPE (item 8).   
Dividend  = an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a dividend (i.e., 
if item 21 > 0 or 127 > 0), and zero otherwise.   
Age  = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the 
current year. 
OperatingCycle = the log of receivables to sales (item 2/item 12) plus inventory to COGS (item 
3 / item 41) multiplied by 360.   
Loss = an indicator variable that takes the value of one if net income before 
extraordinary items (item 18) is negative, and zero otherwise.   
Cash   = the ratio of cash (item 1) to total assets (item 6).  
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses.  Panel B presents Pearson correlations 
for these variables.  Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by lagged total assets.  AQ is a measure of 
accruals quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005).  AQWi is a modified 
version of the accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008).  FOG is a measure of financial statement 
readability computed by Li (2006).  The FRQ Index is computed as the standardized average of AQ, AQWi, and 
FOG.  OverFirm is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked (deciles) measure of cash and leverage 
(multiplied by minus one).  LogAsset is the log of total assets.  Mkt-to-Book is the ratio of the market value to the 
book value of total assets. σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of CFO.  σ(Sales) is the standard deviation of the sales.  
σ(I) is the standard deviation of Investment.  For σ(CFO), σ(Sales), and σ(I), the numerators are deflated by average 
total assets and are computed over years t-5 to t-1.  Z-Score is a measure of distress computed following the 
methodology in Altman (1968).  Tangibility is the ratio of PPE to total assets.  K-structure is a measure of market 
leverage computed as the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt to the market value of equity.  Ind. K-
structure is the mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry.  CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales.  
Slack is the ratio of cash to PPE.  Dividend is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a 
dividend.  Age is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  
OperatingCycle is a measure of the operating cycle of the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if net income before extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise.  Institutions is the percentage of firm shares 
held by institutional investors.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm.  InvG-Score is the measure of 
anti-takeover protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), multiplied by minus one.  G-Score dummy is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing, and zero otherwise.   
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics  
 
OBS OBS Mean STD Min Median Max 
Investment t+1 (%) 34,791 14.14 16.32 -4.00 9.28 121.50 
AQ 34,791 -0.06 0.05 -0.29 -0.04 0.00 
AQWi 34,791 1.18 0.37 0.41 1.12 3.11 
FOG 20,443 -19.31 1.42 -25.65 -19.15 -16.16 
FRQ Index 20,443 0.01 0.62 -2.55 0.04 2.36 
LogAsset 34,791 5.55 2.19 0.97 5.46 11.03 
Mkt-to-Book 34,791 1.92 1.51 0.51 1.42 14.01 
σ(CFO) 34,791 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.80 
σ(Sales) 34,791 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.95 
σ(I) 34,791 11.29 13.91 0.51 6.63 98.20 
Z-score 34,791 1.28 1.42 -7.58 1.38 4.83 
Tangibility 34,791 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.25 0.91 
K-structure 34,791 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.12 0.94 
Ind. K-struc. 34,791 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.76 
CFOsale 34,791 -0.08 0.96 -13.10 0.06 0.80 
Slack 34,791 1.98 5.63 0.00 0.27 66.01 
Dividend 34,791 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Age 34,791 19.13 15.01 1.00 14.00 79.00 
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Oper. Cycle 34,791 4.68 0.72 1.86 4.75 6.53 
Losses 34,791 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Institutions 34,791 0.37 0.28 0.00 0.35 1.00 
Analysts 34,791 5.59 7.54 0.00 2.00 38.00 
InvG-Score 34,791 -3.54 4.78 -15.00 0.00 0.00 
G-Score Dummy 34,791 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 1 – Cont’d 
Panel B – Correlation matrix 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXI XXI XXI 
Investment 1.00                        
AQ -0.13 1.00                       
AQWi -0.07 0.19 1.00                      
FOG -0.05 0.08 0.04 1.00                     
FRQ Index -0.13 0.66 0.64 0.60 1.00                    
LogAsset -0.12 0.44 0.06 0.00 0.26 1.00                   
Mkt-to-Book 0.36 -0.18 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 1.00                  
σ(CFO) 0.20 -0.66 -0.07 -0.08 -0.42 -0.41 0.26 1.00                 
σ(Sales) 0.00 -0.44 -0.03 -0.05 -0.27 -0.27 0.04 0.38 1.00                
σ(I) 0.15 -0.19 -0.04 -0.07 -0.16 -0.07 0.09 0.34 0.15 1.00               
Z-score -0.21 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.15 -0.19 -0.37 0.05 -0.30 1.00              
Tangibility 0.00 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.26 -0.19 -0.29 -0.25 -0.03 -0.05 1.00             
K-structure -0.24 0.17 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.21 -0.37 -0.16 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.34 1.00            
Ind. K-struc. -0.24 0.31 0.11 0.05 0.25 0.29 -0.31 -0.28 -0.14 -0.07 0.09 0.52 0.52 1.00           
CFOsale -0.20 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.19 -0.24 -0.33 -0.01 -0.18 0.47 0.13 0.07 0.14 1.00          
Slack 0.13 -0.24 -0.08 -0.06 -0.20 -0.20 0.23 0.30 0.12 0.08 -0.21 -0.36 -0.24 -0.26 -0.30 1.00         
Dividend -0.11 0.35 0.13 0.10 0.30 0.42 -0.10 -0.34 -0.24 -0.18 0.18 0.26 0.06 0.26 0.14 -0.19 1.00        
Age -0.12 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.44 -0.10 -0.26 -0.17 -0.19 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.11 -0.16 0.43 1.00       
Op. Cycle -0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.41 -0.17 -0.31 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.04 1.00      
Losses 0.03 -0.29 -0.10 -0.09 -0.25 -0.29 0.04 0.33 0.14 0.18 -0.51 -0.12 0.10 -0.12 -0.30 0.15 -0.30 -0.19 0.02 1.00     
Institutions 0.02 0.29 0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.65 0.05 -0.28 -0.18 -0.03 0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.12 -0.05 0.19 0.16 0.00 -0.26 1.00    
Analysts 0.05 0.24 0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.69 0.18 -0.20 -0.16 -0.04 0.05 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.10 -0.07 0.22 0.25 -0.03 -0.18 0.50 1.00   
InvG-Score 0.06 -0.30 -0.06 -0.02 -0.20 -0.68 0.01 0.28 0.21 0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.14 -0.39 -0.43 0.03 0.21 -0.56 -0.52 1.00  
G-Score Dum -0.06 0.30 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.69 0.02 -0.28 -0.21 -0.13 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.35 0.36 -0.03 -0.21 0.59 0.54 0.93 1.00 
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Table 2 – Conditional Relation between Investment and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
This table presents pooled time-series cross-sectional regression OLS coefficients of a model predicting 
Investment.  Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by lagged total assets.  AQ is measure of 
accruals quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005).  AQWi is a 
modified version of the accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008).  FOG is a measure of 
financial statement readability computed by Li (2006).  FRQ Index is computed as the standardized average 
of AQ, AQWi, and FOG.  OverFirm is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked (deciles) measure 
of cash and leverage (multiplied by minus one).  LogAsset is the log of total assets.  Mkt-to-Book is the ratio 
of the market value to the book value of total assets. σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of CFO.  σ(Sales) is 
the standard deviation of the sales.  σ(I) is the standard deviation of Investment.  For σ(CFO), σ(Sales), and 
σ(I), the numerators are deflated by average total assets and are computed over years t-5 to t-1.  Z-Score is 
a measure of distress computed following the methodology in Altman (1968).  Tangibility is the ratio of 
PPE to total assets.  K-structure is a measure of market leverage computed as the ratio of long-term debt to 
the sum of long-term debt to the market value of equity.  Ind. K-structure is the mean K-structure for firms 
in the same SIC 3-digit industry.  CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales.  Slack is the ratio of cash to PPE.  
Dividend is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a dividend.  Age is the 
difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  OperatingCycle is a 
measure of the operating cycle of the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if net 
income before extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise.  Institutions is the percentage of firm shares 
held by institutional investors.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm.  InvG-Score is the 
measure of anti-takeover protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), multiplied by minus 
one.  G-Score dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing and zero 
otherwise.  The model includes industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
classifications.  T-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and 
year level.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Financial Reporting Quality Proxy 
Predictors AQ AQWi FOG FRQ Index t+1 (%) 
FRQ 14.106** 0.718* 0.251** 1.082*** 
 (2.12) (1.89) (1.98) (2.60) 
FRQ*OverFirm -34.796*** -2.386*** -1.235*** -3.862*** 
 (-3.50) (-2.67) (-2.96) (-4.46) 
Joint significance  0.0004 0.0051 0.0029 0.0000 
     
Governance Variables     
Institutions 6.342*** 6.659*** 7.904*** 7.647*** 
 (6.04) (6.44) (5.15) (4.92) 
Analysts 0.054 0.063 0.077 0.073 
 (1.19) (1.35) (1.16) (1.07) 
InvG-Score -0.193*** -0.210*** -0.205*** -0.188** 
 (-3.21) (-3.46) (-2.74) (-2.51) 
G-Score Dummy -2.594*** -2.576*** -1.859** -1.850** 
 (-3.70) (-3.71) (-2.22) (-2.21) 
Institutions*OverFirm -2.146 -2.850 -4.700* -3.957 
 (-1.07) (-1.45) (-1.87) (-1.52) 
Analysts*OverFirm 0.001 -0.021 0.037 0.049 
 (0.01) (-0.24) (0.35) (0.44) 
InvG-Score*OverFirm 0.045 0.081 0.111 0.080 
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 (0.49) (0.89) (0.94) (0.67) 
     
Control Variables     
OverFirm 6.784*** 12.047*** -14.769* 8.515*** 
 (6.87) (10.17) (-1.84) (8.50) 
LogAsset -0.645*** -0.641*** -1.048*** -1.049*** 
 (-7.24) (-6.96) (-7.24) (-7.33) 
Mkt-to-Book 2.285*** 2.310*** 2.209*** 2.183*** 
 (12.44) (12.48) (12.45) (12.53) 
σ(CFO) 5.396** 7.070*** 10.971*** 8.794*** 
 (2.23) (3.40) (4.13) (3.26) 
σ(Sales) -3.490*** -3.241*** -3.402*** -3.779*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.42) (-3.22) (-3.64) 
σ(I) 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (6.23) (6.18) (4.27) (4.27) 
Z-score -1.173*** -1.191*** -1.082*** -1.035*** 
 (-5.68) (-5.77) (-7.12) (-6.69) 
Tangibility 12.457*** 12.497*** 13.638*** 13.730*** 
 (12.10) (12.74) (13.49) (13.49) 
Ind K-structure -19.575*** -19.274*** -19.395*** -19.598*** 
 (-14.27) (-14.09) (-9.69) (-9.80) 
CFOsale -0.982*** -0.965*** -1.256*** -1.270*** 
 (-5.25) (-5.24) (-6.54) (-6.54) 
Dividend -0.601*** -0.593*** -0.237 -0.220 
 (-2.61) (-2.59) (-1.02) (-0.94) 
Age -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (-4.34) (-4.28) (-3.13) (-3.07) 
Operating Cycle -0.440** -0.452** -0.451* -0.440* 
 (-2.17) (-2.20) (-1.89) (-1.82) 
Losses -3.578*** -3.593*** -3.845*** -3.838*** 
 (-11.84) (-11.91) (-10.20) (-10.23) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 34,791 34,791 20,443 20,443 
R-square (%) 21.42 21.38 22.67 22.74 
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Table 3 – Financial Reporting Quality and Deviations from Expected Investment 
This table presents results from multinomial logit pooled regressions.  The dependent variable is based on the level 
of unexplained investment.  Firm-year observations in the bottom quartile of unpredicted investment are classified 
as under-investing (‘Low’), observations in the top quartile are classified as over-investing (‘High’), and 
observations in the middle two quartiles are classified as the benchmark group (‘Mid’).  Panel A (B) presents the 
results for a model predicting the likelihood that a firm will be in ‘Low’ (‘High’) group.  Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. Panel B presents Pearson correlations for these variables.  
Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by lagged total assets.  AQ is a measure of accruals quality 
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005).  AQWi is a modified version of the 
accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2008).  FOG is a measure of financial statement readability 
computed by Li (2006).  FRQ Index is computed as the standardized average of AQ, AQWi, and FOG.  OverFirm is 
a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked (deciles) measure of cash and leverage (multiplied by minus 
one).  LogAsset is the log of total assets.  Mkt-to-Book is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total 
assets. σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of CFO.  σ(Sales) is the standard deviation of the sales.  σ(I) is the standard 
deviation of Investment.  For σ(CFO), σ(Sales), and σ(I), the numerators are deflated by average total assets and are 
computed over years t-5 to t-1.  Z-Score is a measure of distress computed following the methodology in Altman 
(1968).  Tangibility is the ratio of PPE to total assets.  K-structure is a measure of market leverage computed as the 
ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt to the market value of equity.  Ind. K-structure is the mean K-
structure for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry.  CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales.  Slack is the ratio of cash 
to PPE.  Dividend is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a dividend.  Age is the 
difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  OperatingCycle is a measure 
of the operating cycle of the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if net income before 
extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise.  Institutions is the percentage of firm shares held by institutional 
investors.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm.  InvG-Score is the measure of anti-takeover 
protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), multiplied by minus one.  G-Score dummy is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing and zero otherwise.  T-statistics are presented in 
parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering of observations by firm.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A – Under-investment versus normal investment 
 Financial Reporting Quality Proxy 
Predictors AQ AQWi FOG FRQ Index t+1 (%) 
FRQ -1.810*** -0.039 -0.042** -0.103** 
 (-3.00) (-0.81) (-2.40) (-2.32) 
     
Governance Variables     
Institutions -0.497*** -0.511*** -0.461*** -0.451*** 
 (-4.19) (-4.30) (-2.96) (-2.90) 
Analysts -0.001 -0.001 -0.014** -0.014** 
 (-0.12) (-0.14) (-2.15) (-2.17) 
InvG-Score 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.021 
 (1.04) (1.00) (1.08) (1.07) 
G-Score Dummy -0.022 -0.028 -0.002 -0.006 
 (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.01) (-0.03) 
     
Control Variables     
LogAsset -0.031 -0.035* 0.010 0.012 
 (-1.47) (-1.66) (0.28) (0.37) 
Mkt-to-Book -0.035 -0.033 -0.014 -0.015 
 (-1.62) (1.55) (-0.52) (-0.56) 
σ(CFO) -1.446*** -0.980*** -1.796*** -1.969*** 
 (-4.74) (-3.50) (-4.69) (-5.06) 
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σ(Sales) 0.387*** 0.469*** 0.676*** 0.643*** 
 (2.91) (3.59) (4.09) (3.89) 
σ(I) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (5.53) (5.43) (5.82) (5.88) 
Z-score -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 
 (-5.78) (-5.85) (-4.06) (-4.01) 
Tangibility -0.069 -0.113 -0.306 -0.294 
 (-0.47) (-0.79) (-1.64) (-1.58) 
K-structure 0.776*** 0.781*** 0.669*** 0.668*** 
 (6.00) (6.03) (4.18) (4.17) 
Ind K-structure -5.812*** -5.834*** -5.829*** -5.793*** 
 (-18.68) (-18.70) (-15.19) (-15.12) 
CFOsale 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 
 (3.40) (3.59) (3.66) (3.62) 
Slack 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (2.80) (2.71) (2.60) (2.59) 
Dividend -0.063 -0.068 -0.053 -0.048 
 (-1.13) (-1.21) (-0.76) (-0.69) 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.005* 0.005* 
 (1.05) (1.04) (1.77) (1.77) 
Operating Cycle -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.160*** -0.160*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.88) (-3.27) (-3.28) 
Losses 0.105** 0.111** 0.157*** 0.153*** 
 (2.37) (2.49) (2.76) (2.70) 
Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 34,791 34,791 20,443 20,443 
Pseudo R2 (%) 8.43 8.46 8.78 8.79 
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Table 3 – continued 
 
Panel B – Over-investment versus normal investment 
 Financial Reporting Quality Proxy 
Predictors AQ AQWi FOG FRQ Index t+1 (%) 
FRQ -2.049*** -0.036 -0.027* -0.107*** 
 (-3.62) (-0.78) (-1.80) (-2.60) 
     
Governance Variables     
Institutions 0.767*** 0.752*** 0.898*** 0.903*** 
 (8.12) (7.97) (7.17) (7.21) 
Analysts 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009* 0.009* 
 (2.82) (2.78) (1.85) (1.82) 
InvG-Score -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.013 
 (-1.38) (-1.44) (-1.00) (-1.01) 
G-Score Dummy -0.262** -0.267** -0.156 -0.157 
 (-2.25) (-2.29) (-1.22) (-1.23) 
     
Control Variables     
LogAsset -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.162*** -0.160*** 
 (-7.53) (-7.78) (-6.11) (-6.06) 
Mkt-to-Book 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 
 (12.11) (12.16) (10.20) (10.17) 
σ(CFO) 0.079 0.587** 0.834** 0.657* 
 (0.28) (2.31) (2.46) (1.90) 
σ(Sales) -0.092 0.002 0.145 0.107 
 (-0.73) (0.01) (0.93) (0.69) 
σ(I) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (8.74) (8.64) (6.08) (6.15) 
Z-score -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.125*** 
 (-7.36) (-7.44) (-5.44) (-5.35) 
Tangibility 1.240*** 1.189*** 1.409*** 1.424*** 
 (11.45) (11.09) (10.24) (10.34) 
K-structure -1.683*** -1.680*** -1.777*** -1.777*** 
 (-13.34) (-13.32) (-11.12) (-11.12) 
Ind K-structure -1.140*** -1.159*** -1.077*** -1.038*** 
 (-5.13) (-5.20) (-3.90) (-3.75) 
CFOsale -0.013 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 
 (-0.66) (-0.43) (-0.11) (-0.19) 
Slack 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.90) (0.76) (0.83) (0.79) 
Dividend -0.133*** -0.139*** -0.117** -0.109* 
 (-2.83) (-2.96) (-1.98) (-1.84) 
Age -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.51) (-2.66) (-2.64) 
Operating Cycle -0.173*** -0.171*** -0.178*** -0.175*** 
 (-6.11) (-6.05) (-4.98) (4.92) 
Losses -0.315*** -0.308*** -0.311*** -0.316*** 
 (-6.84) (-6.70) (-5.18) (-5.27) 
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Firm Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 34,791 34,791 20,443 20,443 
Pseudo R2 (%) 8.43 8.46 8.78 8.79 
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Table 4 – Alternative Dependent Variables – Capex and Non-Capex 
This table presents pooled time-series cross-sectional regression OLS coefficients of a model predicting Capex and 
Non-Capex investment.  Capex is a measure of capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE.  Non-capex  is the sum of 
research and development and acquisitions deflated by lagged total assets.  FRQ Index is computed as the 
standardized average of AQ, AQWi, and FOG.  OverFirm is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked 
(deciles) measure of cash and leverage (multiplied by minus one).  LogAsset is the log of total assets.  Mkt-to-Book 
is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets. σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of CFO.  σ(Sales) 
is the standard deviation of the sales.  σ(I) is the standard deviation of Investment.  For σ(CFO), σ(Sales), and σ(I), 
the numerators are deflated by average total assets and are computed over years t-5 to t-1.  Z-Score is a measure of 
distress computed following the methodology in Altman (1968).  Tangibility is the ratio of PPE to total assets.  K-
structure is a measure of market leverage computed as the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt to the 
market value of equity.  Ind. K-structure is the mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry.  
CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales.  Slack is the ratio of cash to PPE.  Dividend is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm paid a dividend.  Age is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in 
CRSP and the current year.  OperatingCycle is a measure of the operating cycle of the firm.  Loss is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if net income before extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise.  Institutions 
is the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the 
firm.  InvG-Score is the measure of anti-takeover protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
multiplied by minus one.  G-Score dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing 
and zero otherwise.  Capex is a measure of capital expenditure scaled by lagged PPE.  Non-Capex is a measure of 
R&D expenditure and acquisition scaled by lagged total assets.  The model includes industry fixed-effects based on 
the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classifications.  T-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients 
and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at 
the firm and year level.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable =  
Predictors Capex  Non-Capex 
FRQ 2.319*** 1.563*** 
 (3.38) (5.95) 
FRQ*OverFirm -8.508*** -4.555*** 
 (-5.91) (-8.02) 
Joint significance  0.0000 0.0000 
   
Governance Variables   
Institutions -1.940 3.383*** 
 (-0.99) (2.88) 
Analysts 0.229** -0.013 
 (2.49) (-0.27) 
InvG-Score -0.467*** -0.247*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.19) 
G-Score Dummy -2.734** -1.134** 
 (-2.47) (-1.98) 
Institutions*OverFirm 16.299*** -0.577 
 (4.08) (-0.24) 
Analysts*OverFirm -0.327* 0.111 
 (-1.73) (1.42) 
InvG-Score*OverFirm 1.423*** 0.166* 
 (5.84) (1.65) 
   
Control Variables   
OverFirm 12.376*** 4.902*** 
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 (7.06) (6.28) 
LogAsset -0.168 -0.797*** 
 (-0.69) (-6.13) 
Mkt-to-Book 4.092*** 1.454*** 
 (16.34) (9.32) 
σ(CFO) 25.318*** 2.482 
 (4.09) (1.20) 
σ(Sales) 0.719 -3.150*** 
 (0.41) (-3.08) 
σ(I) 0.037*** 0.103*** 
 (3.24) (5.05) 
Z-score 2.029*** -1.601*** 
 (10.57) (-10.53) 
Tangibility -16.703*** -4.204*** 
 (-7.57) (-7.48) 
Ind K-structure -6.561** -14.201*** 
 (-2.36) (-9.01) 
CFOsale 0.276 -1.372*** 
 (0.58) (-7.23) 
Dividend -2.379*** 0.184 
 (-4.43) (0.82) 
Age -0.074*** -0.010 
 (-5.34) (-1.36) 
Operating Cycle -1.457*** -0.577*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.19) 
Losses -6.237*** -2.241*** 
 (-11.48) (-5.85) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Firm/Year Cluster Yes Yes 
OBS 20,443 20,443 
R-square (%) 24.22 25.45 
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Table 5 – Aggregate Over-Investment Partitions 
This table presents pooled time-series cross-sectional regression OLS coefficients of a model predicting Investment.  
Investment is a measure of total investment scaled by lagged total assets.  FRQ Index is computed as the 
standardized average of AQ, AQWi, and FOG.  OverFirm is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked 
(deciles) measure of cash and leverage (multiplied by minus one).  LogAsset is the log of total assets.  Mkt-to-Book 
is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets. σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of CFO.  σ(Sales) 
is the standard deviation of the sales.  σ(I) is the standard deviation of Investment.  For σ(CFO), σ(Sales), and σ(I), 
the numerators are deflated by average total assets and are computed over years t-5 to t-1.  Z-Score is a measure of 
distress computed following the methodology in Altman (1968).  Tangibility is the ratio of PPE to total assets.  K-
structure is a measure of market leverage computed as the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt to the 
market value of equity.  Ind. K-structure is the mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry.  
CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales.  Slack is the ratio of cash to PPE.  Dividend is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm paid a dividend.  Age is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in 
CRSP and the current year.  OperatingCycle is a measure of the operating cycle of the firm.  Loss is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if net income before extraordinary items is negative, zero otherwise.  Institutions 
is the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the 
firm.  InvG-Score is the measure of anti-takeover protection created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
multiplied by minus one.  G-Score dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if G-Score is missing 
and zero otherwise.  OverAggregate is a ranked variable based on the unexplained aggregate investment rate for all 
firms in the economy.  OverIndustry is a ranked variable based on the unexplained industry-year investment.  The 
model includes industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classifications.  T-statistics are 
presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and 
time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year level.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
FRQ 0.393 0.779*** 
 (1.21) (4.12) 
FRQ*OverIndustry -1.883***  
 (-2.91)  
FRQ*OverAggregate  -1.881*** 
  (-6.14) 
Joint significance  0.0009 0.0000 
   
Governance Variables   
Institutions 5.689***  
 (8.29)  
Analysts 0.031  
 (0.71)  
InvG-Score -0.245***  
 (-2.89)  
G-Score Dummy -1.715**  
 (-2.03)  
Institutions*OverIndustry -0.818  
 (0.56)  
Analysts* OverIndustry 0.069  
 (1.31)  
InvG-Score* OverIndustry 0.193**  
 (2.56)  
   
Control Variables   
OverIndustry 7.335***  
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 (6.68)  
OverAggregate  0.402 
  (0.57) 
LogAsset -0.912*** -0.002 
 (-5.67) (-0.02) 
Mkt-to-Book 2.256*** 2.557*** 
 (13.18) (15.37) 
σ(CFO) 11.272*** 6.371*** 
 (4.49) (3.71) 
σ(Sales) -3.856*** -2.471*** 
 (-3.72) (-4.16) 
σ(I) 0.075*** 0.118*** 
 (3.81) (7.66) 
Z-score -0.913*** -0.624*** 
 (-6.18) (-3.04) 
Tangibility 10.194*** 10.756*** 
 (8.31) (11.41) 
K-structure -7.455*** -8.022*** 
 (-7.52) (-15.71) 
Ind K-structure -8.451*** -12.542*** 
 (-4.05) (-9.10) 
CFOsale -1.336*** -1.390*** 
 (-6.41) (-6.69) 
Slack -0.047 0.032 
 (-1.03) (1.21) 
Dividend -0.358* -0.729*** 
 (-1.68) (-3.06) 
Age -0.032*** -0.048*** 
 (-3.41) (-6.72) 
Operating Cycle -0.840** -0.157 
 (-2.41) (-0.63) 
Losses -3.321*** -3.679*** 
 (-9.11) (-15.59) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Firm/Year Cluster Yes Yes 
OBS 20,443 71,036 
R-square (%) 23.79 19.40 
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Figure 1 – Investment Residual across Financial Reporting Quality Groups 
 
Panel A – Under-Investment 
 
Under-Investment  across reporting quality groups
-15
-14.6
-14.2
-13.8
-13.4
-13
Low Medium High
Ito
ta
l R
es
id
ua
l
AQ AQWi FOG FRQ
 
 
Panel B – Over-Investment 
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